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This paper examines Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) strategies, which aim to abate pollution emissions, in a mixed duopoly under the noncooperative and cooperative regimes. We assume that the two firms produce differentiated products and compete in Cournot fashion, and the ECSR strategies will increase consumers’ willingness-to-pay. Our result shows that the optimal per-unit and total emissions abatement levels under the noncooperative regime are necessarily higher than those under the cooperative regime. Moreover, social welfare under the noncooperative regime is necessarily higher than that under the cooperative regime.

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This paper examines Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) strategies, which aim to abate pollution emissions, in a mixed duopoly under the noncooperative and cooperative regimes. We assume that the two firms produce differentiated products and compete in Cournot fashion, and the ECSR strategies will increase consumers’ willingness-to-pay. Our result shows that the optimal per-unit and total emissions abatement levels under the noncooperative regime are necessarily higher than those under the cooperative regime. Moreover, social welfare under the noncooperative regime is necessarily higher than that under the cooperative regime.